Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label GDP. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

India: GDP data for Q3 2023–24 , the real story | Arun Kumar

 (Published in The Leaflet)

GDP data for Q3 2023–24: The mystery of a robust growth

Recently released GDP figures have sprung a surprise, baffled experts and overturned the government’s own data and projections. What could be the reason?

GROSS Domestic Product (GDP) figures have sprung a surprise— showing a growth of 8.4 percent in Quarter 3 of 2023–24, on top of the previous two quarter’s growth of 8.2 percent and 8.1 percent.

The annual growth for 2023–24 is projected at 7.6 percent. But given the growth rates in the first three quarters, it is likely to be above 8 percent, unless the economy decelerates sharply in Q4, of which there is little sign.

The surprise

Experts are embarrassed that how could they be so far off. In December 2023, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had upped its projected growth rate from 6.5 percent to 7 percent.

Various foreign credit rating agencies had revised the expected growth rate to only around 6.5 percent. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected a 6.3 percent rate of growth.

In December 2023, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had upped its projected growth rate from 6.5 percent to 7 percent.

The Union finance ministry of India said that the rate of growth would be comfortably above 6.5 percent, but did not say it would be over 8 percent. The largest Indian bank, which usually gives a glowing picture of the economy, which then gets amplified in the media, just a day earlier had predicted a rate of growth of between 6.7 percent and 6.9 percent. It argued that there was a moderation in economic activity in Q3.

Media reports had been mentioning that the festive demand in October and November had been moderate— not the expected big boost to economic activity.

Reports were that the rural market was subdued. El Nino was being mentioned as a reason for problems in agriculture. High cereal prices, in spite of a ban on exports of rice and wheat, were being cited as a reason to doubt the official production figures of agriculture.

Also read: The K is Indian GDP’s reality: Why deny?

A moderation of profits in the corporate sector due to a slowdown in demand was being cited as another signal of slow growth. The war in Gaza was creating problems in shipping and leading to an increase in the prices of imports.

A slowdown in China, Europe, Britain and Japan was the reason for the slowdown in exports. All these were the reasons why the Q3 numbers were expected to herald a slowdown.

Despite these factors, growth has accelerated. This mystery needs to be resolved.

Data points to growing disparities

Sectoral performance compared to Q3 of 2022–23 shows higher growth in manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas, public administration and so on.

There has been a sharp increase in mining, from 1.4 percent to 7.5 percent, and in manufacturing from -4.8 percent to 11.6 percent.

Another boost is from net taxes, which have increased from -2.6 percent to 32 percent. In the case of construction, growth remains unchanged at 9.5 percent.

In the case of group trade, hotels, etc., growth declined from 9.2 percent to 6.7 percent, for the group of financial, real estate, etc., the drop is from 7.7 percent to 7 percent. The biggest drop is in the group agriculture, livestock, etc., from 5.2 percent to -0.8 percent.

Another boost is from net taxes, which have increased from -2.6 percent to 32 percent.

Analysis of the expenditure components of GDP shows a decline in the share of private final consumption, from 61.3 percent to 58.6 percent and government final consumption from 8.7 percent to 7.8 percent. The external sector, represented by exports minus imports, shows a decline from -0.7 percent to -1.8 percent.

These three engines of growth are pulling growth down.

So the growth acceleration is coming from an increase in Gross Fixed Capital Formation, from 31.8 percent to 32.4 percent, in valuables, from 1.1 percent to 1.7 percent and in discrepancies, from -3.3 percent to 0.2 percent.

Also read: GDP growth: The gap between reality and rhetoric

This pattern of increases and decreases in different components of GDP can help resolve the mystery.

First, the sharp increase in net taxes suggests that the incomes of tax-paying citizens have risen sharply. They belong mostly to the organised sector of the economy.

The unorganised sector hardly contributes to the taxes since most of the incomes of this sector are below the taxable limit and they are exempt from the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

So, the sharply higher net tax collection indicates that incomes of the well-off sections belonging to the organised sector have sharply increased.

Second, the decline in the share of consumption in GDP also points in the same direction. The well-off citizens consume a smaller percent of their income while the poor consume most of their income. Thus, a shift of incomes in favour of the well-off will lead to a decline in the share of consumption in GDP.

Third, the decline in the share of agriculture in GDP also suggests the same. It is the largest component (in employment terms) of the unorganised sector. About 85 percent of the farmers are small and marginal cultivators operating less than 5 acres of land and have low incomes from farming. As their income declines, the share of consumption in GDP would drop.

Fourth, the government has shifted its expenditure towards capital accounts so the share of its consumption has declined.

Further, the government’s capital expenditure is shifting towards capital-intensive sectors and away from labour-intensive ones. This boosts the organised sector at the expense of the unorganised sector.

Also, the government’s stated aim is to formalise the economy through digitisation which is damaging the unorganised sector and benefitting the organised sector.

Also read: A taxing tale: Assessing the impact of six years of GST

Finally, the sharp increase in the ‘discrepancies’ points to the errors in the data. Both the production side and the expenditure side of GDP have large errors. To unravel the mystery, there is a need to understand these errors.

Contradictions in GDP data

For the quarterly GDP estimation, the unorganised sector (except, for agriculture) data is not available. That is also the case for most of the organised sector. So GDP estimation is based on various assumptions and approximations. How valid are these?

According to the press note, GDP estimates are based on ‘indicators’, ‘using the benchmark-indicator method’.

The government has shifted its expenditure towards capital accounts so the share of its consumption has declined.

Further, previous year estimates are ‘extrapolated’ using relevant performance indicators. Indicators used are the Index of Industrial Production, the financial performance of listed companies in the private corporate sector, air and rail traffic, etc. These are largely from the organised sector.

In brief, the quarterly estimates are largely based on limited organised sector data (but for agriculture). The limited organised sector data is used to proxy the unorganised sector. This washes out the decline in the unorganised sector and the economy appears to be doing well.

This is not the only lacuna. Projections from the previous year’s data are used. If the previous year’s estimates were in error, that would impact the current year’s estimates.

If the economy suffers a shock, a projection from the previous (normal) year would overstate growth. The methodology would require a change. That would be true for the pandemic and the accomopanying lockdown, and demonetisation. The impact of the shock would continue to affect the estimates, based on projections from the previous year, for several years.

Also read: Is the decline in multidimensional poverty in India real?

Consumption data from the recently released household consumer survey shows per capita rural and urban consumption as ₹3,773 and ₹6,459 per month. But GDP data gives a figure of ₹9,896. This is a result of over-estimating the production of the unorganised sector which produces a large part of the consumption goods.

Thus, even when the economy is not performing well, the method of estimation of GDP will show good growth, as has happened with Q3 of the financial year 2023–24.

Conclusion

The above points to why even if parts of the economy are languishing, GDP data shows the opposite. This is not just to do with the large gap between GDP and Gross Value Added.

Even when the economy is not performing well, the method of estimation of GDP will show good growth, as has happened with Q3 of the financial year 2023–24.

There is evidence of growing disparity in the economy since the unorganised sector is declining while the organised sector is growing— the K-shaped pattern of growth. The recently released Consumption Survey data also points to this.

Clearly, the method of estimating the quarterly GDP based largely on organised sector data overestimates growth, especially when there is a shock to the economy.

At best, the recently released GDP data represents agriculture and the organised sector but not the entire economy. 

 

 

Monday, February 5, 2024

K shaped it is. Why deny? | Arun Kumar

The Leaflet

The K is Indian GDP’s reality: Why deny?

Supporters of the government deny the K in India’s GDP growth, despite overwhelming evidence. What other forms of inequality— gender, regional, between agriculture and non-agriculture, capital and labour and caste inequality— will the officialdom deny, asks Arun Kumar.

THE K-shaped pattern of growth within the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) pointed to by critics has riled officialdom and its supporters because it implies not only growing inequality but an overestimation of GDP and its growth.

The supporters deny any possibility of a dichotomous K-shaped growth pattern on the basis of data on income tax returns, labour force participation, consumption, etc. In doing so, they commit a methodological error.

Types of inequality

There are three different kinds of inequalities in an economy— wealth, income and consumption. The government supporters mix them up. There is a hierarchy between them with wealth inequality greater than income inequality greater than consumption inequality.

The reason for this ranking is that everyone has to consume a basic minimum to survive. The poor consume almost their entire income and hardly save. Often they borrow to consume so that their consumption is larger than their income. People at higher income levels save. The higher the income bracket, the more the savings.

Everyone has to consume a basic minimum to survive. The poor consume almost their entire income and hardly save.

So, as one goes to higher and higher income brackets, consumption becomes a smaller and smaller fraction of the income. So, the ratio of consumption to income falls with income. That is why income disparity is greater than the consumption disparity.

Further, the savings are invested and become part of one’s wealth. The higher the income, the more the savings and the accumulation of wealth. The poor have almost no savings and may be in debt, that is, they have negative wealth.

Thus, the wealth curve rises even more steeply than the income curve. The wealth of the wealthy yields an additional income and that leads to more inequality.

These theoretical aspects need to be kept in mind in the debate on inequality. A bare perusal of the arguments of the supporters of the official line shows a mix-up of these three kinds of inequality. What does the actual available data reveal?

Factors underlying growing inequality

First, the GDP data has huge errors since it does not independently account for the contribution of the non-agriculture unorganised sector. This component of GDP has been declining since demonetisation when it was hit hard and hardly recovered from this blow.

However, this decline is not officially measured since it is proxied by the growing organised sector. This gives an upward bias to the GDP and incomes of the marginalised sections, resulting in the false claim that inequality is declining.

Second, the growth in the organised sector is at the expense of the unorganised sector and that is the K to which critics point. This is visible in various industries.

For instance, e-commerce (in the organised sector) is growing at the expense of the unorganised sector trade. Similar reports are available from other industries such as fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), leather goods, luggage and pressure cookers.

E-commerce (in the organised sector) is growing at the expense of the unorganised sector trade. Similar reports are available from other industries such as FMCG, leather goods, luggage and pressure cookers.

This applies to most of the industries where an item is produced both in the unorganised and organised sectors. Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data shows rapid growth in the sales of the corporate sector when the economy is mostly stagnant.

That can only imply the growth of this sector at the expense of the other component— the unorganised sector.

Third, taxes are paid mostly by the organised sector and the well-off. The unorganised sector is exempt the Goods and Services Tax (GST). For a turnover of below ₹50 lakh, there is no GST and for turnover up to ₹1.5 crore, tax rate is 1 percent under the composition scheme. Former Union finance minister, late Arun Jaitley, used to say, 5 percent of the units pay 95 percent of the GST.

Corporation tax is mostly paid by the big companies. Income tax is paid mostly by the well-off. Out of around eight crore tax returns filed by individuals, effective tax is paid by only 1.5 crore of a population of 141 crore. That is 1.1 percent population.

So, even if income tax data shows a reduction in disparity, that is only from the return filers, who constitute 5.5 percent of the population. That cannot tell us about inequality in the entire population. For example, 30 crore unorganised sector workers are registered on the e-shram portal. Around 94 percent of them report an income of below ₹10,000 per month, way below the taxable limit.

High tax buoyancy of GST, corporation tax and income tax only reflects the rapid growth of the organised sector. In a stagnant economy, this growth is at the cost of the unorganised sector and that increases disparity.

Further, it is the well-off who generate black money by hiding their incomes. In other words, their incomes are actually higher so inequality is greater.

It is the well-off who generate black money by hiding their incomes. In other words, their incomes are actually higher so inequality is greater.

Fourth, due to inflation, incomes rise but their real value may fall if the rate of inflation is higher. Further, as people earn more they go to a higher tax slab and pay more tax. This is called ‘bracket creep’.

So, increased tax payment does not necessarily mean an increase in people’s real income. That is why the level at which individuals begin to pay tax has been raised from ₹2.5 lakh to ₹5 lakh and now to ₹7.5 lakh.

Fifth, there is an increased production of FMCG in the organised sector but not necessarily of consumption. The market share of the big FMCG companies has increased at the expense of smaller units.

So, organised sector units are producing more and because this is at the expense of unorganised sector units, overall production is not rising. Since the well-off are consuming more, especially premium products, it is people in the lower income brackets who have cut consumption. Thus, FMCG consumption is not an indication of a decline in disparities.

Sixth, Periodic Labout Force Survey (PLFS) data shows an increase in employment in the rural sector. This is mostly distress employment. The poor are too poor to be able to afford not to work.

So they do residual work such as pulling a rickshaw, doing head-load work and selling peanuts on the roadside. This is self-employment and not work generated by the system. It yields low incomes and aggravates disparities.

Further, many workers lost work during demonetisation and lockdown and had to depend on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (MGNREGA) at wages below what they were earning earlier. This again leads to a growth of disparities.

Seventh, the government giving free ration or gas to the poor increases consumption but not income. So income poverty persists even if consumption rises. Giving 5 kg of foodgrains free to 81 crore Indians is itself an admission that income poverty persists. 

Finally, while money wages have risen due to inflation, they mostly lag inflation so that real incomes have fallen. So, who is getting the benefit of an increase in national income— the businesses?

RBI data shows corporate profits have soared. That is why the stock markets have reached new heights. Hence the incomes at the upper rung of the income ladder have risen and so has inequality. This should not be confused with the increase in the wealth of the well-off due to the rise in the valuation of stocks.

The government giving free ration or gas to the poor increases consumption but not income. Giving 5 kg of foodgrains free to 81 crore Indians is itself an admission that income poverty persists.

Conclusion

All the arguments used by supporters of the government to show a decline in inequality and, therefore, an absence of a K-shaped growth pattern, when carefully analysed, prove that indeed a K-shaped pattern of growth exists.

Their argument is based on the denial of the decline of the unorganised sector and the growth of the organised sector at its expense. Since the data is almost entirely based on the organised sector, it masks the K-shaped pattern of growth.

There are also other forms of inequality— gender, regional, between agriculture and non-agriculture, capital and labour and caste inequality.

In addition to K, what else will the officialdom deny?

Arun Kumar is a Retired Professor of Economics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is the author of `Demonetization and Black Economy’ (2018, Penguin Random House). He blogs at http://arunkumarjnu.blogspot.com/

 

 

Thursday, January 4, 2024

What Do We Really Know About India's GDP? | Arun Kumar (The Wire - 4 Jan 2024)

 The Wire

There are two inter-related problems with the GDP data. The infirmity in the data and the invalidity of the method to calculate the GDP.

This is the first article in ‘India Black Boxed’. Read the series introduction here.

Controversy refuses to die down about the size of India’s GDP and its growth rate. It all started when the new GDP series with base 2011-12 was released in 2015. Not only did analysts point to problems, the government itself was unhappy that it showed a higher growth during the UPA’s ten years compared to the post-2014 NDA period.

The pandemic in 2020 severely dented the economy and the economy witnessed its steepest decline since Independence. The recovery from this low base was also steep. This has led to the official claim that India has done well in spite of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine to become the fastest growing major economy in the world. Is this the correct picture of the economy? That depends on the accuracy of the numbers and the policies formulated on that basis.

Pre-pandemic controversies

Doubts about the accuracy of data in the new series from 2011-12 have risen on several counts. To begin with, when the new series was announced in 2015, there was no back series to compare it with. It was said that the new series was based on the MCA21 data base of the industrial sector, which was more complete than what was used till then, the IIP data. It was stated that the back series could not be generated both because the MCA21 data base had not stabilised earlier and the relevant data on employment became available from 2011-12.

But neither of these should have mattered since the MCA21 data base goes back a long time and earlier employment figures could have been used as has been often done. The real reason appeared to be political. Namely, to show higher GDP growth during the NDA period compared to the UPA period.

The next controversy was the government’s claim that the Indian economy grew at an average of about 7% during 2015-2020, which made it the fastest growing large economy in the world. This was undermined by A. Subramanian (2019). He showed that the growth rate was over estimated by up to 2.5% after 2014.

The next blow came when NSSO reported in 2019 that out of a sample of 35,456 companies taken from MCA21 data base, 38.7% were ‘out of survey’ units. These units are either not traceable or misclassified. So, data is either missing or mis-specified. Thus, the use of MCA21 for GDP calculation could be leading to errors in estimation.

The government argued that the inclusion of the ‘out of survey’ companies brings the output closer to the true production and there is no over-estimation of GDP.

A committee was set up to work out the missing back series. Its report showed that the rate of growth was higher during the UPA period compared to the NDA years. The government rejected it and in an unprecedented move, asked the NITI Ayog to rework the series. The NITI Ayog obliged and presented a back series showing that the rate of growth was higher during the NDA period compared to the UPA years.

Upward bias in GDP

The problem with the GDP data becomes clear when the official data shows that the highest rate of growth during the decade of the 2010-20 was in the year of demonetisation, 2016-17. From all accounts, starting November 2016, output was severely impacted in that year. Even if it is assumed that the output was growing up to October 2016, and declined after that, the average GDP growth became negative. This points to the flawed methodology used to measure GDP which gave an 8% upward bias to GDP in 2016-17. Even this flawed methodology showed the official growth rate declining from 8% in Q4 of 2017-18 to 3.1% in Q4 of 2019-20. So, the real actual rate of growth would have become negative even before the pandemic

Pandemic and the lockdown severely impacted the economy in 2020 and more particularly the unorganised sector. Subsequent recovery has been K-shaped – namely, some sectors growing while others (unorganised sector) declined. This decline has not been captured in data leading to over-estimation of the GDP. This becomes clear when one looks at the method of estimation of GDP, especially the quarterly GDP, which is what is usually discussed in public discourse.

Official methodology

I have previously analysed the official document which presents the `Methodology of Compiling Quarterly GDP Estimates’. It mentions three factors that need to be noted regarding the calculation of GDP from the supposedly more accurate production side:

  1. “The production approach used for compiling the QGVA estimates is broadly based on the benchmark-indicator method.”
  2. “In this method, for each of the industry-groups, estimates of GVA are compiled…”
  3. “In general terms, quarterly estimates of Gross Value Added (GVA) are extrapolations of annual series of GVA.”

These three points clarify that for the quarterly estimates of GDP based on the production approach, most current data are not available so, benchmark indicators from an earlier reference year have to be used. The last survey of unincorporated enterprises was carried out in 2015-16 so that the reference year is now dated and does not capture the current reality.

Further, the methodology states that current figures are obtained by extrapolations of the annual series of GVA of previous years. But if the previous year figures are incorrect, how can their extrapolation be correct? This has been the case post the demonetisation, introduction of the Goods and Services Tax and the lockdown. Each of these three occurrences administered a shock to the economy and caused disruption.

Finally, in some cases, the procedure adopted is to make annual projections and then to divide them by four to give the quarterly figures. Two problems arise. First, there are varying levels of activity in the different quarters. For instance, there is heightened activity during the festive season, while it is low at the start of the financial year. So, division by four cannot be correct. Second, errors in the figures of the previous year get projected to the next year.

Shocks undermine the method

The methodology outlined above relies on a smoothly functioning economy. But it will not apply when there are big unexpected changes, called a shock, like due to demonetisation or the sudden lockdown. The shocks impact the basic parameters of the economy. Like the ratio of the unorganised to the organised sector or the real output in the agriculture sector. So, with a shock, neither the ‘benchmark-indicators’ will be valid nor will it be correct to extrapolate from a normal year to the next one that has experienced a shock.

The Indian economy has suffered several shocks since 2016. Demonetisation in 2016 followed by the introduction of the structurally faulty GST in 2017, the NBFC (non-bank financial company) crisis in 2018 and finally the sudden lockdown in 2020. Each of them impacted the unorganised and the organised sectors differentially, thereby changing the ratio between the two and invalidating the old benchmark indicators.

Further issues with quarterly data

The problems related to methodological issues were compounded by the data deficiencies. Even for the organised sector, only limited data is available. For instance, the corporate sector data representing industry is available only for a few hundred firms. In the case of agriculture, it is assumed that targets set by the ministry are achieved. But that has not been the case in the last few years due to heat or late rains or inability of perishable crops to come to the market during the lockdown and demonetisation, so that it rotted in the fields and agricultural output declined while it was taken to have increased. The method for estimating the unorganised sector in the GDP needed to be modified, but this has not been done.

In brief, there are two inter-related problems with the GDP data. The infirmity in the data and the invalidity of the method to calculate the GDP.

The problem was further compounded by the government’s lack of faith in its own employment data which it rejected in 2019 because it showed that unemployment had reached a high of 45 years. Since employment data is used in the calculation of the GDP, if it is rejected, the GDP calculation also becomes unreliable.

To persist with the methodology in the 2017 official document, new indicators are required based on fresh surveys. But no new survey of the unorganised sector has been conducted since 2015. Even the Census has not been conducted in 2021 and that compounds the problem.

Further, each of the shocks listed above impacted the economy differently. So, without a change in the method and resolving the data issues, errors get compounded and reliable GDP numbers cannot be generated.

Stance of international agencies

The government claims that international agencies, like the IMF and the UN, have supported its claims on GDP. Their figures for GDP growth differ from the official figures by a small percent. But that is not surprising since these agencies are not data collecting agencies and use the official data. Even the RBI uses the official data on a host of macro variables.

Effectively, all of them reproduce the errors in the official data and none of them have more accurate data. The surprise is that all these agencies ignore the data-related issues when the errors are glaring. Worse, if Indian data has such huge errors, other developing countries are likely to have similar or even greater errors, making international comparisons meaningless.

Impact on other macro aggregates

GDP data is the base used to estimate other macro aggregates, like consumption and savings. These affect the measurement of poverty and growing inequality. If growth is strong then it would imply strong growth in employment. But this link is broken since growth is in the organised sector while the unorganised sector is declining. The former hardly creates employment while the latter which provides a bulk of the employment is losing employment. So, this lopsided growth has broken the link between growth and employment.

Further, if the unorganised sector declines then the overall demand becomes short, leading to low capacity utilisation and decline in the investment rate and even the organised sector rate of growth will fall. This was visible in the period 2017-18 and 2019-20 (before the pandemic).

The incorrect GDP numbers should impact the fiscal situation. This is reflected in the revenue and expenditures often missing the targets set in the budget. The final figures differ considerably from the budget and revised estimates. But these revisions are not as stark as the errors in the GDP data should lead to.

The reason for this smaller error is that the budget is largely for the organised sectors and of the organised sector. The revenue collection is largely from the organised sector. Most expenditures are also for the organised sector. Where the expenditures pertain to the unorganised sectors like on food, rural development, education and health, revisions are made when the deficit in the budget increases. Thus, the budgetary calculus is not as seriously impacted as the large errors in GDP data ought to lead to.

Conclusion

To conclude, India’s GDP numbers are vitiated due to methodological and data-related deficiencies. This suits the ruling party’s political narrative of a well-functioning economy. By continuing to harp on these incorrect numbers and hiding the true facts, it adds to the non-transparency in the government’s functioning.

Arun Kumar is the author of Understanding Black Economy and Black Money in India.

Wednesday, October 25, 2023

Links to articles, discussions and interviews by Arun Kumar from July to September 2023

 

links to select recent articles, discussions and interviews after three months.

 

1.     Challenges of becoming a developed economy by 1947. In the Leaflet Sept 17. It is at: https://theleaflet.in/technological-challenges-to-becoming-a-developed-country-by-2047/

 

2.     Interview on India’s economic performance. Channel 4 PM September 17. It is at:  https://youtu.be/j_ieEocgqzE

 

3.     Interview on G20 outcome failure and Indian Economy. It is at Jeevansathi.com Sept 15. It is at: https://youtu.be/Ms3ITm1ypdo?si=wSyXvWmshRDdWJ3I

 

4.     G20 serving the interest of the Global landlords. In the Wire Sept 14. It is at: https://thewire.in/world/g20s-new-delhi-declaration-serving-the-interest-of-the-global-landlords

 

5.     Talk on `Adani Scandal - PM silence’. Organized by SundarayyaVignana Kendram. Sept 5, 2023. It is at: https://fb.watch/nr_kCJTdKX/?mibextid=RUbZ1f

 

6.     GDP `discrepancies’ explained. Two articles

a. In News9live on Sept 3. It is at: https://www.news9live.com/opinion-blogs/decoding-the-significance-of-7-8-gdp-growth-for-indian-economy-expert-speaks-2270756

b. In the Wire on September 5. https://thewire.in/economy/understanding-gdp-growth-through-discrepancies-and-why-the-major-push-is-not-visible

 

7.     Discussion on likely further revelations on Adani affair. On HindiSatya.com. August 25, 2023. It is at: https://www.google.com/search?sca_esv=569887179&tbm=vid&q=Hindi+Satya.com+With+Mukesh+Kumar+on+Adani+affair&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjr9uPixtWBAxWjS2wGHdZcC9sQ8ccDegQIDRAH&biw=1024&bih=710&dpr=1.25#fpstate=ive&vld=cid:4bc75314,vid:r4NglZUPOB8,st:0

 

8.     Discussion on de-dollarization and the Emerging World Order with Air Marshal Matheswaran. Organized by the Peninsula Foundation. August 22, 2023. It is at: https://youtu.be/Fsrnh1QCyXM?si=K273Tfi74svjVZqQ

 

9.     The truth of the official claims: Data is incorrect. In the Wire on August 18, 2023. It is at: https://thewire.in/economy/the-hollowness-of-modi-governments-tall-claims-and-self-praise-on-economy

 

10.  What should G20 agenda should be from people’s perspective?. Talk at the Conference titled We20: People’s Summit on G20 in New Delhi. August 18. It is at: https://wgonifis.net/2023/08/18/economists-social-movements-political-leaders-give-clarion-call-to-stand-up-to-the-anti-people-policies-of-g20/

 

11.  In Hindi How can India become 3rd largest economy soon? In the Hindustan. August 17, 2023. It is at: https://www.livehindustan.com/blog/latest-blog/story-hindustan-opinion-column-17-august-2023-8583185.html

 

12.  Discussion on Hurdles to Becoming an Economic Superpower. Mint. August 16. It is at: https://www.youtube.com/live/YnF2N7FBORM?feature=share

 

13.  In Hindi. What is wrong with Economic Policies? Analysis of the PM’s Address on Independence Day. ABP, Uncut. August 15. It is at: https://youtu.be/cj_eMbD71T4

 

14.  In Hindi. Mood of the Nation: Economic Aspect. Public India August 12. It is at: (From 1 hour onward). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2z7O4tjMOQ

 

15.  Panel discussion on release of Neerja’s book, `How Prime Minister’s Decide’. August 8. It is at: https://youtube.com/live/BgFG-cfmLUs?feature=share

 

16.  Reduction in Multi-dimensional Poverty in India: Is it for real? In the Leaflet, August 6, 2023. It is at: https://theleaflet.in/is-the-decline-in-multidimensional-poverty-in-india-real/

 

17.Minimum Guarantee Bill of Rajasthan Govt. – an Analysis. In the Wire, August 5, 2023. It is at: https://thewire.in/rights/rajasthan-minimum-guaranteed-income-bill-intent-marginalisation

 

18.  India for Democracy Conclave. Talk on economic inequality and other aspects. August 4. It is at: https://youtube.com/live/GyZxHbYrdmw?feature=share

 

19.  In Hindi. Why India will not the 3rd largest economy anytime soon. Article in the Print on the 28th July and interview in The Public on 27th July. It is at:

a.      https://youtu.be/yCDD2k6GTHg

b.     https://hindi.theprint.in/India/economist-rfuses-pm-modi-claims-that-india-will-become-3rd-economy-in-the-world-in-bjp-3rd-term/575018/

 

20.  Long article on ‘Intricacies of GST’ and why it has not fulfilled its promises. In Mainstream, July 29. It is at: http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article13636.html

 

21.  Development gone rogue – Underlying causes of high floods in Delhi. In the Wire, July 20. It is at: https://thewire.in/environment/development-rogue-flood-delhi 

 

22.  Why 28% tax on Online Gaming is justified. At News9live, July 12. It is at: https://www.news9live.com/deep-dive/imposing-28-gst-on-online-gaming-will-not-lead-to-the-collapse-of-the-industry-expert-opines-2210136

 

23.  Interview on technology from US under the Indo-US Accord during PM’s visit. The Public on July 2, 2023. It is at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXHVv-uPHsM

 

24.  Assessing Impact of Six Years of GST. In the Leaflet. July 1, 2023. It is at:

https://theleaflet.in/a-taxing-tale-assessing-the-impact-of-six-years-of-gst/

 

25.  Long Article: Modi Rule vs Nehru’s Era: Comparing the Incomparable. In Mainstream. July 1. It is at: http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article13565.html

 

26.  How much employment needs to be generated in India? In the Hindu. June 29. It is at:https://www.thehindu.com/data/data-how-much-employment-generation-does-the-economy-need/article67030514.ece

 

27.  Asymmetric technology relation between India and US and what it tells about our R&D. In the Wire. June 28. It is at: https://thewire.in/tech/indias-weak-r-and-d-culture-behind-asymmetric-indo-us-deal.

 

28.  Brief talk on decoding current inflation.  At Lallantop. June 28. It is at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vs8RhVOyF_4

 

29.  Interview on Rich Indians leaving India and Broader Issues at HW News. June 20. It is at: https://youtu.be//SutPv0MCCuQ

 

30.  Short Interview in Hindi on why rich Indians are leaving the Country in large numbers. In the Wire, June 17. It is at: https://youtu.be/CJPllYj8vtk

 

31.  Article on Why PLI scheme is sub-optimal. In the Wire. June 16, 2023. It is at: https://thewire.in/government/pli-scheme-subsidies-demand-shortage-jobs

 

32.  Panel discussion in Hindi on India’s federal structure being damaged. It is at News Time, June 16. At https://www.youtube.com/live/k9nisfsVw7Q?feature=share   

 

33.  Article in Hindi on strengthening Indo-US relations. Hindustan June 15, 2023. It is at: https://www.livehindustan.com/blog/latest-blog/story-hindustan-opinion-column-15-june-2023-8305724.html